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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines two key dimensions of the impact of immigration for Australia and 
related policy aspects. One is sub-national and the other is national. They are, first, the 
regional location aspects of immigration and second, the aggregate unemployment 
implications of immigration. These are chosen so as to focus on two important issues that 
condition public attitudes towards immigration. In relation to the first, there is a common 
positive view that channelling migration towards regional areas assists regional development 
and reduces pressure on metropolitan areas. The paper reviews regional concepts embodied 
in Australian immigration policy and the ways in which visa arrangements have implemented 
policies geared towards the regional dispersal of immigrants. Using official data, it discusses 
the demographic and economic impacts of these policies, and in particular, considers the 
extent to which immigrants to regional Australia remain there over the longer-term. In 
relation to unemployment, a common concern is that immigrants take jobs from local 
workers. The paper examines – using statistical regression methodology – the relationship 
between immigration and national aggregate unemployment in Australia. It evaluates the net 
consequences of immigration for both existing residents and new arrivals together. The paper 
concludes that, with good policy design in each case, regional location encouragement can be 
effective for immigrants and that immigrants need not take more jobs than they create. The 
analysis demonstrates that mixed methods approaches to important social science issues can 
be productive, and helpful also for policy. Evidence, such as that presented in this paper, 
offers a powerful basis from which to counter negative public and political discourses 
surrounding immigration in contemporary Australia. 
 [265 words] 
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Introduction 
Within the wide ambit of Graeme Hugo’s work, immigration had a prominent place. This 
paper examines two key dimensions of the impact of immigration for Australia. One is sub-
national and the other is national. They are, first, the regional location aspects of immigration 
and, second, the aggregate unemployment implications of immigration. These are chosen so 
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as to focus on two important issues that help condition public attitudes to the phenomenon 
of immigration.  
 
Markus (2011) concluded that majority opinion – within the Australian population – typically 
supports the view that immigration unduly pressures provision of city infrastructure. There is 
thus a common positive view that if more immigration towards regional areas of Australia can 
be enabled, it assists regional development and reduces pressure on metropolitan areas. 
Markus (2011) also found that attitudes to immigration are closely correlated with the 
unemployment rate. A common concern relating to Australia’s immigration intake is that 
immigrants take jobs from local workers (see also Davis and Deole 2015; Goot and Watson 
2011; and Markus 2016). This paper addresses both of these issues in two main parts. 
 
The first half of the paper reviews regional concepts embodied in Australian immigration 
policy and the ways in which visa arrangements have influenced the dispersal of immigrants 
to regional locations. Using official data, we examine evidence of the impacts of these 
dispersal efforts and find that such policy can have some significant redistribution effects. In 
the second part we analyse the relationship between immigration and national aggregate 
unemployment in Australia, using statistical regression methodology based on causality and 
co-integration. This provides insights into the net consequences of immigration for both 
existing residents and for new arrivals. We show that Australia’s large scale immigration 
program has not been significantly associated with any overall increase in unemployment 
rates.  
 
Immigration to regional Australia 
Regional immigration policy: background and evolution 
In Australia, immigration matters are the constitutional responsibility of the Commonwealth 
Government. However, the Commonwealth can be conscious of regional matters in its policy 
formulation and work with States and Territories at its discretion. In recent decades, formal 
regional immigration policy for Australia has centred on the State-Specific and Regional 
Migration (SSRM) Scheme, which was instituted by the Commonwealth in 1996-97. This 
scheme includes a suite of skilled and business visas for individuals interested in settling and 
working outside Australia’s major cities.  
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The SSRM Scheme is intended as one mechanism to support population growth in slower 
growing and stagnant regions, alleviate environmental pressures resulting from sustained 
immigration flows to major cities, and respond to skills shortages outside these cities (Hugo 
2008a,b; Withers and Powall 2003). Former New South Wales (NSW) Premier, Bob Carr, put 
the issue of population pressure around Australia’s major cities starkly:  
 
Right down the east coast of Australia, you'd see the end between the coast and the 
mountain range, you'd see the end of any farming. You'd see the end of any 
conservation, open space. You'd have cities…a totally urbanised east coast (Carr 
2000). 
 
Specific regional visas have been the vehicle chosen to address some of these concerns, short 
of reductions in total immigration levels. In the case of the SSRM Scheme, in order for these 
visas to be granted, prospective migrants must be explicitly supported by a State/Territory 
Government, an employer, or a family member living in a regional area.  
 
The State/Territory role operates under ideas of ‘co-operative federalism’. This consultative 
process is on-going. State and Territory Governments are interested in increasing skilled and 
business immigration to their respective jurisdictions and to distribute these migrants where 
they can best contribute to the labour market. Each Government has a skilled and business 
migration unit that promotes and facilitates such migration. Some local Councils also have 
operational roles: they are gazetted as ‘regional certifying bodies’ to assist with the 
administration of the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) visas. RSMS visas are one 
of a number of visas that fall under the broader SSRM scheme – as shown in Table 1. 
 
Since the inception of the SSRM Scheme 20 years ago, the regional immigration visa structure 
has been modified and the visa criteria revised. The main visa categories and characteristics 
are outlined in Table 1. Regardless of these modifications, as Federal immigration visas they 
do have universal criteria relating to age, English language proficiency, skill levels and relevant 
work (or business/investment) experience. Differences in criteria then relate to the skilled 
occupations in demand, which may vary between State and Territory labour markets, and 
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between large and smaller area labour markets within States and Territories. The skilled 
occupations in demand are determined and periodically reviewed by the State and Territory 
Governments. While the universal criteria are generally identical to those adhered to in the 
independent skilled immigration program, regional visa applicants can avail themselves of 
bonus points1 for a family or State/Territory Government nomination.  
 
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the core SSRM skilled visas, including those that 
were available until the first major immigration policy reform in 2007. The reason for including 
the now ceased visas is that some of them were in operation for a decade and contributed to 
the regional immigration policy outcomes that are considered in this paper. The holders of 
those visas were surveyed (by the Department of Immigration and by State and Territory 
Governments), and results of some of these surveys led to policy modifications discussed later 
in this paper. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
There are also regional dimensions to temporary visas such as the Working Holiday Maker 
visa, including as part of the recent Northern Australia Development Agenda (Hugo 2008b; 
DIBP 2015). Further, since 2009, Australia has been operating the Pacific Seasonal Workers 
Scheme (PSWS). This Scheme has permitted employers in horticulture – and since 2016 
agriculture more broadly and the tourism sector in northern Australia2  to recruit temporary, 
low-skilled and unskilled labour from Pacific Island countries and Timor Leste. The PSWS and 
the Working Holiday Maker visa are separate from the SSRM Scheme. 
 
The visas offered under the SSRM Scheme started off from a small base. They represented 
just 4 per cent of Australia’s annual skilled migration stream in 1996-97 (Golebiowska 2007), 
but grew to account for 38.8 per cent of this stream by 2013-14 (Department of Immigration 
1 Permanent skilled and business migration to Australia operates on a points-based system. Prospective 
migrants must reach a minimum number of points to become eligible to apply for a visa.  
2Including the Northern Territory (NT), in its entirety, as well as Western Australia (WA) and Queensland (QLD) 
above the Tropic of the Capricorn. 
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and Border Protection (DIBP) 2014). Region-linked international immigration has therefore 
become a major element of Australian immigration.  
 
Regional immigration policy: operation, definitions and transition 
In the development of regional policy for Australian immigration under the SSRM Scheme, 
two key issues emerge as crucial to the operation of the visa programs: how regions are 
defined for regional visa purposes and access to permanent residency. 
 
With regards to the former, Australia has adopted a flexible and substantially delegated 
approach. Areas eligible for regional settlement vary between visas and not all areas eligible 
would be intuitively considered ‘regions’ by many. This is partly because State/Territory 
Governments were given authority, by the Commonwealth, to determine where within their 
jurisdictions regional immigrants could settle (Parliament of Australia 2001). Initially under 
the SSRM Scheme, ‘regional’ Australia covered (a) areas with less than 200,000 residents and 
(b) low population growth metropolitan areas. The latter were those that, in the last 
intercensal period (preceding the launch of the policy), had posted an average population 
growth rate below 50 per cent of the national average population growth rate (Department 
of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) 2005c). Under these criteria 
all non-metropolitan and some metropolitan areas, including certain capital cities, were 
included in the definition of ‘regions’. Sydney, Brisbane and Perth were excluded, but 
Adelaide, Hobart and Darwin were included. Indeed, applying the above criteria meant that 
the entire states of South Australia and Tasmania, and the Northern Territory, became eligible 
locations. Adelaide and Hobart qualified because of their trends of net out-migration and low 
population growth rates. Darwin qualified mainly due to its population being below 200,000 
and due to its geographic isolation from the rest of Australia. Even Melbourne has been 
eligible for some regional visas under the SSRM Scheme. This situation arose from its low 
average population growth in the first part of the 1990s, preceding the launch of the policy. 
Its eligibility has been contested (Parliament of Australia 2001) but as Hugo (2008b: 555) 
observed, the strong pro-immigration stance of the Victorian Government has been critical in 
retaining eligibility. 
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Switching to the present, a combination of demographic, economic and political factors can 
explain why some areas remain eligible for regional immigrant settlement and others do not. 
Specifically, the average intercensal population growth rates (2001-2006, 2006-2011) have 
exceeded the 50 per cent benchmark in Adelaide, Hobart and Melbourne (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) 2012; Golebiowska 2012) and, technically speaking, these cities have ceased 
to meet the low growth metropolitan area criterion of the SSRM Scheme. However, if 
Adelaide and Hobart were excluded accordingly, South Australia and Tasmania would lose 
one key mechanism by which they can support their small and stagnant populations. In the 
south-west, lobbying by the Western Australian Government and industry has resulted in re-
classifying Perth as an eligible city for some regional skilled visas, despite it not meeting the 
aforementioned criteria. The primary motivation was acute skills shortages in Perth (DIBP n.d. 
b, Trenwith 2011). 
 
The second key issue that is crucial to the operation of the SSRM Scheme is permanency. In 
Australia, most regional skilled and business visas are now two-step visas whereby meeting 
the temporary (usually two years) residency and employment (or business in case of business 
immigrants) requirements in the area for which an immigrant is nominated permits a 
subsequent application for a permanent residence visa. The two-step process is intended as 
a retention measure, aimed at supporting population and economic growth in areas of initial 
settlement. It is anticipated that after a period of working and living in a regional area, 
immigrants may be less prone to relocate to a major city upon attaining permanent residence. 
Families, especially, acquire accommodation, have schooling arrangements, build social 
networks, acquire employment and so on (DIMIA 2005a,b; Wulff and Dharmalingham 2008).  
 
For the regional temporary visa holders, common routes to permanent residency include 
applying for other visas under the SSRM Scheme. For example, holders of the temporary 
Skilled Regional visa can apply for a permanent Skilled Regional visa. This visa does not require 
a State/Territory Government nomination but operates on the premises that immigrants may 
be interested in staying in the original area of settlement after they have lived there for the 
minimum two years required by their temporary Skilled Regional visa. Holders of the 
temporary 457 visas who are working in regional areas can apply for the RSMS visa through 
their employer. The RSMS visa requires a minimum two-year stay with the nominating 
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employer, meaning effectively at least two additional years’ stay in a regional area. RSMS 
visas may be cancelled if migrants do not see through the two-year employment period with 
their employers (DIBP 2016). A further example of a permanent visa which also carries a 
minimum two-year stay condition in the nominating State/Territory is the Skilled-Nominated 
visa (see Table 1). Holders of this visa may relocate to another jurisdiction if they advise the 
original nominating State/Territory Government (Migration Western Australia n.d.). 
 
In relation to the question of permanency, the history of the Skilled-Designated Area 
Sponsored (SDAS) visa provides an excellent example of how documentation and analysis of 
immigrant settlement behaviours can lead to constructive policy change. SDAS was initially a 
permanent visa (see Table 1). However, in the early 2000s a survey conducted by DIMIA 
(2005b) revealed that SDAS migrants were not settling in the Designated Areas where their 
nominators lived and were choosing to live in major cities instead. This was contrary to the 
objectives of this visa (Parliament of Australia 2001) and, with a view to assist retention, in 
2006 SDAS became a two-step visa (Phillips and Spinks 2012). This case illustrates how 
demographic and geographical research can provide insights into immigrant behaviours and 
outcomes and be an important tool for informing policy development. Likewise, the Skilled-
Independent Regional (SIR) transitional visa (Birrell et al. 2006), was introduced following a 
new research analysis of regional migration and associated visa policy reform suggestions 
(Withers and Powall 2003). Policy measures that could ensure more sustained regional 
residence by immigrants, such as transitional visas, were therefore a partial antidote for then 
NSW Premier Carr’s criticisms of high Commonwealth immigration intake levels. 
 
Given the broad objectives of the SSRM Scheme – to support population growth in regional 
areas and to alleviate population pressures in major cities – it seems clear that transitional 
conditional visas are crucial to ensuring that internal mobility does not undermine, from the 
beginning, any strong regional settlement experience and outcomes. 
 
Assessing the benefits of regional immigration: a review of the literature 
Given this history and the importance of regional immigration growth, it is appropriate that 
significant research has been conducted on regional immigration matters. In the initial years 
of the SSRM Scheme, the Federal and State/Territory Governments routinely commissioned 
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or conducted surveys to understand how regional visa holders were settling and performing 
economically and if there were grounds therein for policy adjustments (Cully and Goodes 
2000; DIMIA 2005a,b). There has also been complementary literature such as parliamentary 
reports and reviews of regional immigration (Parliament of Australia 2001; 2015) and 
commissioned reports and research written by academics (Institute for Social Science 
Research 2010; Hugo 2008a,b; Khoo et al. 2005; Withers and Powall 2003; Hugo 1999) or 
consultants (Piper and Associates 2009). 
 
As a phenomenon, international migration to regions also happens in other countries. Hugo 
and Morén-Alegret (2008) argued that international migration to regional areas of high-
income countries has recently become an integral element of the economic, demographic 
and social change in these areas and has been an outcome of longer-term trends affecting 
them (e.g. out-migration of youth and labour shortages). Argent and Tonts (2015) similarly 
adopted an international perspective and placed their considerations of regional immigration 
in Australia in the context of ‘the global countryside’, a concept developed by Woods (2007), 
which refers to rural spaces engaging with globalisation in multiple ways and undergoing a 
transformation as a result. 
 
To date, scholarly analyses of regional immigration policy in Australia have looked at the 
governance of the policy, and its economic and demographic impacts, in particular retention 
rates and labour market participation (Hugo 2008a,b; Golebiowska 2012,2015; Cameron et 
al. 2012; Massey and Parr 2012). They have generally documented good participation in the 
labour market and noted that retention of immigrants in regional areas depends on a 
combination of factors, including job satisfaction and career prospects, quality of the local 
services and infrastructure (e.g. schooling, health, transport, and recreation) and attachment 
to the local community. Social adaptation of immigrants in regional Australia has been more 
specifically studied for example by Wulff and Dharmalingham (2008) and Krivokapic-Skoko 
and Collins (2016). These studies have found that social connectedness in regional centres is 
strong for those immigrants who have lived in Australia for longer periods, for families with 
children and for immigrants from certain countries. They found that South African, 
Zimbabwean and the Filipino-born develop particularly strong local connections. Krivokapic-
Skoko and Collins (2016) have also observed that the existence of ‘meeting places’ that 
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cultural groups can use, plays a role in developing a sense of belonging locally and attracts 
immigrants to specific regional centres. 
 
Understanding, and in turn influencing, immigrants’ mobility motivations is clearly important 
for the success of regional immigration policies. In addition to some of the directly related 
works mentioned above, these motivations have been considered for example by Hugo et al. 
(2006), Goel and Goel (2009) and Taylor et al. (2014). Broadly speaking, these studies have 
found that economic, lifestyle and social factors are reasons both for moving into, and out of, 
a regional area. An emerging stream of research has looked specifically at immigrant 
settlement in remote and peripheral regions of Australia (Golebiowska et al. forthcoming; 
Taylor et al. 2014; Institute for Social Science Research 2010). It has found that immigrant 
mobility to and away from these regions is motivated by the same set of factors as above, and 
that sufficient stock of quality, accessible and affordable housing is one of the critical 
facilitators of longer-term settlement in remote and peripheral regions (perhaps even more 
so than in larger regional urban centres). 
 
The studies reviewed above have analysed the demographic, economic and social 
contributions regional immigrants make, identified the conditions that should be in place to 
support retention and what factors contribute to mobility. The next section enhances this 
knowledge base by analysing, in chronological order, the results of selected surveys of 
regional immigrants. This makes it possible to explore the demographic outcomes of regional 
immigration policy at different ‘touchpoints’. It reveals variations in the rates of actual and 
intended continued residence (retention) in the areas of original settlement depending on 
the visa type and visa conditions at the time of the survey. 
 
Appraisal of Australia’s regional immigration policy: immigrant retention in regional areas 
Full formal evaluation of the demographic and economic or other impacts of Australia’s 
regional migration policy is not straightforward. This is due especially to modifications of the 
visa criteria over the years, visa amalgamations in recent years, imperfect comparability of 
statistical data across years and some large capital cities such as Melbourne or Adelaide being 
eligible locations for settlement. Also, with the recently ‘refreshed’ DIBP website, not all 
surveys of regional visa holders previously available on the website are accessible now. With 
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these limitations in mind, in terms of the demographic impacts of regional immigration, there 
is greater knowledge of what happens when immigrants arrive, where they intend to settle 
and do settle, than of what happens after they have fulfilled their minimum residency and 
work visa obligations.  
 
However, useful findings are available from the results of surveys that the Department of 
Immigration commissioned, conducted or otherwise supported and also, as a case study, from 
the results of a survey commissioned by the Northern Territory Government (Taylor et al. 
2014). The specific surveys discussed in the remainder of this paper include: the Cully and 
Goodes survey of the RSMS migrants (2000) commissioned by the (then) Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) and held in 2000, the DIMIA surveys of RSMS 
(2005a) and SDAS (2005b) migrants held in 2004 and involving migrants residing in all States 
and Territories; and Taylor et al.’s (2014) survey of RSMS and State and Territory Nominated 
migrants in the Northern Territory in 2012.  
 
Starting with the issue of retention, the DIMIA (2005b) survey of SDAS migrants was 
conducted prior to SDAS becoming a two-step visa. It was revealed then that retention 
outside metropolitan areas ranged between less than 50 per cent for NSW and Queensland, 
and 36 per cent for Victoria. Melbourne was a strong magnet: 9 per cent of all SDAS migrants 
with a sponsor from outside Melbourne lived there in addition to 58% of SDAS migrants who 
had a sponsor from Melbourne and lived in the city. On arrival in Australia, 10 per cent of all 
SDAS migrants by-passed Designated Areas and settled directly in non-Designated Areas. 
Furthermore, 16 per cent of SDAS migrants who had resided in Australia for more than three 
years (at the time of the 2004 survey), lived in non-Designated Areas such as Sydney or 
Brisbane. These 16 per cent included most of the 10 per cent of all SDAS migrants, who had 
never resided in a Designated Area. These retention and dispersal outcomes were poor and 
the introduction of a two-step visa process was thus intended to assist with reversal of such 
findings. However, no later surveys of SDAS or SRS visa (which replaced SDAS and SIR) holders 
are available to ascertain the exact extent of improvements.3   
3 There is one later survey of regional immigrants (Institute for Social Science Research 2010) but it contains only 
a minuscule number of the SRS immigrants, which does not permit evaluating how much retention has 
improved. 
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Conversely, assuming little change of intentions, the RSMS visa (which now requires a 
minimum two-year stay in a regional area) may have delivered good retention rates. The 
overall retention rates of the RSMS migrants (that is, for those settled and working in an 
eligible metropolitan area such as Adelaide, as well as in non-metropolitan areas) have 
fluctuated over the years. In 2000, Cully and Goodes reported a 70 per cent retention rate.  
Meanwhile, in 2005, DIMIA reported an 85 per cent retention rate for those who had spent 
the minimum two years in their original location, and 91 per cent for those still on the original 
two-year contracts (DIMIA 2005a). In the Northern Territory, Taylor et al. (2014) reported an 
84 per cent retention rate for those past their original two-year contracts. These fluctuations 
are partially affected by the fact that the minimum two-year stay with the original employer 
(or else a visa cancellation) was introduced after Cully and Goodes’s (2000) survey, which 
found a 30 per cent separation rate from the original employer, before the conclusion of the 
initial contract.  
 
In Taylor et al.’s survey (2014) conducted in 2012, 93 per cent of the RSMS respondents (all 
of whom arrived in 2008-2011) were still in the Northern Territory, and 78 per cent intended 
to continue living there because of employment opportunities, a liking for the lifestyle and 
the climate. The dominant region of origin was South-East Asia and it is likely that familiarity 
of these South-East Asians with the tropical lifestyle and climate has contributed to this 
outcome. The seven per cent of RSMS visa holders who left the Northern Territory had 
nevertheless stayed for a median period of 38 months. Another 22 per cent intended leaving, 
thus resulting in a likely overall leakage of around 30 per cent of RSMS migrants from the 
Northern Territory.  
 
 
 
Looking briefly to the economic contributions of regional migrants, the surveys above have 
reported high rates of employment of the principal visa holders (DIMIA 2005a;b; Taylor et al. 
2014). The effects of regional migrants’ employment will naturally vary between States and 
Territories. In the early 2000s, employment of regional visa holders either supported 
additional annual State/Territory labour force growth or was helping to offset a more general 
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pattern of labour force decline (Golebiowska 2007). The contributions were between 0.23 per 
cent and 10 per cent of annual labour force growth in large States, but larger still in the less 
populous jurisdictions with smaller labour forces like South Australia, the ACT, Tasmania and 
the NT (Golebiowska 2007).  
 
Overall, between 1996-97 and 2013-14, the regional skilled and business immigrant intake 
has grown nearly ten-fold as a share of Australia’s annual skilled migration program (from 4% 
to 38.8%). Given this expanded share, alongside evidence of improved immigrant retention 
and strong economic contributions in regional areas found in the reviewed surveys, the policy 
of encouraging regional settlement of immigrants can be considered effective. These surveys 
suggest that even with the unavoidable secondary mobility of some regional immigrants, the 
overall positive population effects from their settlement in Australia (on non-metropolitan 
areas, and on smaller and/or slower growth capital cities like Darwin, Hobart or Adelaide) are 
now strong, certainly for the short to medium-term. This applies because of policy design, in 
particular the role of the two-year visa condition. Such evidence, particularly of improved 
retention rates, can serve to counter negative public attitudes and discourses about 
immigration to Australia. The evidence presented here shows that, with well-designed policy 
mechanisms, immigrants can be channelled into, and then retained in, regional areas – rather 
than adding to the populations of Australia’s largest metropolitan areas. In the remainder of 
this paper, we use statistical evidence to counter another prominent argument that is 
regularly used to foster anti-immigration sentiment: the idea that immigration creates 
unemployment for the Australian-born. 
 
 
 
Immigration and unemployment in Australia  
As discussed above, the capacity of Australian (Local, State, Territory, and Federal) 
Governments to ensure that immigration flows can help meet regional development 
objectives can be said to enhance public support for immigration policy (Markus and Arnup 
2010). Likewise, an ability of government to convincingly reassure electors that immigration 
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will not be taking jobs from ‘locals’, will also likely improve immigration support (Markus and 
Arnup 2010). At the very least, if it can be maintained that immigrants create as many jobs 
(or more jobs) than they fill, that will be an important political and economic proposition.  
 
To an average citizen it may seem obvious that immigrants add to labour supply and hence 
take jobs. And in a direct sense this is true. What is also true is that immigrants can also cause 
the demand for labour to increase – both through their own spending (many bring financial 
assets with them from sale of businesses or property and investment funds and savings), and 
through others’ spending in response to their arrival. The latter includes businesses and 
governments, community organisations and local communities and family networks, with all 
of them increasing outlays in response to the settlement and living needs of new arrivals. 
What matters is the balance of these contending supply and demand influences. Determining 
their precise balance is an empirical issue. Conveying the findings and facts from the empirical 
evidence – on the balance between jobs taken and created by immigrants – is a political 
leadership and communication issue. The remainder of this paper focusses on the empirical 
economic analysis of how immigration impacts employment. Such analysis can underpin the 
capacity for governments to communicate effectively to the public regarding the employment 
effects of immigration. The empirical evidence presented in this paper provides a solid basis 
from which to allay public concerns, since it affirms that overall the modern Australian 
immigration experience is such that new arrivals create at least as many jobs as they take. 
 
For Australia, among a large number of studies which have examined the impact of 
immigration on Australian unemployment, the earliest was Withers and Pope (1985), later 
extended to cover a much longer time period in Pope and Withers (1993). More recent studies 
using different definitions, data periods and statistical techniques have found similar results, 
as for example with Shan et al. (1999), Kónya (2000) and Boubtane et al. (2013). There is in 
fact a clear consensus across these studies, and from Australian immigration research more 
broadly, that increases and decreases in immigration have not been associated with net 
increases or decreases in the aggregate unemployment rate. Here, this consensus is tested 
further so as to include the latest immigration experience and to test the earlier findings using 
more advanced statistical methodology. The finding is to affirm the previous conclusions. An 
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accumulation of such findings, tested rigorously, provides a strong basis for the aspiration to 
evidence-based policy in this publicly contentious field.  
 
The force of this conclusion can be seen descriptively by a simple graphical investigation in 
which a measure of the unemployment rate is plotted against the immigration rate, using 
data for 1960 to 2013 (Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Figure 1 shows that the Australian unemployment rate was relatively high during the mid-
1980s and early 1990s. However, it recorded a consistent decline through the middle and 
towards the end of the 1990s, and throughout the early 2000s. Starting from 2008, the 
unemployment rate began to increase again until the end of the period (2013). On the other 
hand, the immigration rate shows considerable variation during this period. As shown in 
Figure 1, it was relatively high during the mid-1960s, end of the 1970s and end of the 1980s. 
However, during the 1990s and the early 2000s it recorded lower levels, but then increased 
substantially in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, reaching the highest level 
of all over the entire sample period in 2008. Afterwards, there was a sharp fall over 2009 and 
2010. A slight increase is observed toward the end of the period. 
 
By comparing the trend of the two series together, Figure 1 indicates that there is no co-
movement between immigration and unemployment. In particular, movement in the 
Australian immigration rate appears to be inconsistent with observed movement in the 
unemployment rate during most of the last five decades. That said, this straightforward 
graphical analysis is not sufficient to draw conclusive evidence about the nature of the 
relationship. In the following sections we report on new formal investigations conducted 
using the so-called ‘Granger causality’ test designed for examining such relationships. These 
tests are named after Clive Granger, who received the Nobel Prize for this work in economics. 
Full technical details of data and procedures are available in Elnasri (2015). 
 
Co-integration analysis: methods 
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The relevant co-integration analysis is presented here through two stages. Such analysis seeks 
to ensure that any relationship found is not co-incidental or ‘spurious” i.e. the variables of 
interest are ‘causally’ related and hence truly closely linked or ‘co-integrated’. This is 
accomplished here, first, by implementing a simple bivariate framework and, second, by then 
applying a multivariate framework. In the two frameworks, we test the hypothesis as to 
whether changes in the Australia immigration rate, M t , cause changes in Australia’s 
unemployment rate, U t ,  or vice versa. Table 2 presents the results of Chi-squared statistics 
and the corresponding P-values of the test.  
 
It is well recognised that the results from such causality testing may be sensitive to the lag 
structure, especially the length of time allowed for the effects to flow through. Accordingly, 
results are presented for several lag lengths (i.e., 1 - 5 lags).  In the upper half of Table 2, the 
null hypothesis tested is whether M t (changes in Australia’s immigration rate) does not 
Granger-cause Ut (changes in Australia’s unemployment rate). In the lower half of the table, 
the null hypothesis tests whether Ut does not Granger-cause Mt. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the above stated null hypotheses are not rejected, and 
accordingly we can conclude that, within such a bivariate framework, there is no causality 
running from immigration to unemployment, or vice versa. 
 
However, there is argument in the previous literature commencing with Pope and Withers 
(1993) that the simple causality method undertaken above can suffer from an omitted 
variable problem. Thus, to check the robustness of the results from the bivariate model, a 
more general model is specified to represent the relationship between immigration and 
unemployment, by including further explanatory variables. This is stage two of the analysis.  
In particular, we have adopted the model of Pope & Withers (1993), which is based on a 
general disequilibrium framework of unemployment. More specifically, a four dimensional 
vector autoregressive model is represented by the following equation: 
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zt = α° + �βt z t−i
k
t=1
+ ϵt, 
where   zt  is a vector consisting of four non-stationary variables beyond the variables looked 
at in the bivariate analysis: per capita  real wages (Wt), real per capita GDP (Y), change in 
industrial structure of employment measured by the Stoikov index, (STOt), and 
unemployment benefits proxied by the number of persons receiving unemployment benefits 
(BRt). These join the unemployment rate (Ut) and immigration rate (Mt), for the wider stage 
two analysis.  
 
More discussion on this disequilibrium model is provided in Pope and Withers (1993) and 
Shan et al. (1999). But in line with more recent literature (e.g., Islam 2007), the present study 
can further analyse the Pope-Withers model itself within the more advanced co-integration 
framework proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990; 1994). This is therefore the full wider 
test sought to re-examine the immigration-unemployment relationship even more 
authoritatively and with more up-to-date statistics. 
 
Before testing for the co-integration relationship between immigration and unemployment 
in this further way, it is important to determine whether all variables of interest are integrated 
of order one, I(1), so that it can be affirmed that the results are not biased. Thus, Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were carried out on the time-series in levels and differences. Three 
lags were chosen to determine the stationarity of the variables. As shown in Table 3, the tests 
suggest that the series are indeed integrated of order 1.  
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
Co-integration analysis: findings 
First, the Johansen tests for co-integration were applied. The trace statistic at rank = 0 is found 
to be 207.74 which exceeds the critical value 94.15. Thus, the null hypothesis of no co-
integrating equations is rejected. The evidence of co-integration between variables in the VAR 
model tests the possibility of Granger non-causality. However, this does not provide 
information on what the co-integration equation or the direction of the causal relationship 
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could be. To examine this issue, the vector error correction model (VECM) was applied. VEC 
has two advantages: it reveals the direction of causality, and it distinguishes between the 
short-run and long-run Granger causality. A VECM was estimated for time series covering the 
period 1985-2013. Following the estimation, short-run and long-run Granger causality tests 
were performed and their results are reported in Table 4. As seen in the table, the results 
indicate that the null hypotheses of Granger non-causality from immigration to 
unemployment, and Granger non-causality from unemployment to immigration, cannot be 
rejected at conventional significance levels.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Because the time series available for BRt  (the number of persons receiving unemployment 
benefits) and  STOt  (change in industrial structure of employment measured by the Stoikov 
index) start only from 1982 and 1985 respectively, while the series of other variables start 
from 1960, it is of interest to explore the information available in the longer time series. Thus 
another specification of VECM, which excludes  STOt and BRt , is estimated to cover the 
period 1960-2013. Results of the subsequent short-run and long-run Granger causality tests 
are reported in Table 5. Similar to the previous models there is no evidence here either that 
immigration causes Australia’s unemployment. There is no co-integration. The results are 
sustained even with alternative additional variables included and different time periods of 
analysis. 
  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
These results overall confirm that there is no causal relationship, in either direction, between 
immigration rates and unemployment rates in Australia. Therefore, this empirical evidence 
does not support any belief that, in aggregate, immigrants rob jobs – at least across the last 
three decades in Australia. The migration policy settings in place in Australia have therefore 
allowed significant immigration intakes to be received, without substantial aggregate adverse 
impacts for Australian unemployment rates resulting. This is in spite of Australia having one 
of the higher shares of overseas-born in its population across the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. Similar findings exist in relation to 
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female workforce participation. Australia’s labour market has expanded enormously through 
increased female workforce participation over recent decades, without related changes in 
aggregate unemployment.  
 
Factors in Australia’s migration policy settings that may have assisted with these positive 
employment outcomes are not directly examined in the statistical analysis here. But they 
could include such factors as the high skill share that typifies Australian immigration program 
management, relative to other countries. The predominant roles accorded to the points-
selection process for independent migrants, plus the employer nomination and 
State/Territory nomination schemes for permanent visa entry, both provide selection 
mechanisms that favour entry of immigrants with skills. There are also strong skill, or human 
capital, elements embedded explicitly or implicitly for temporary entry through the 457 and 
the Working Holiday Maker visa schemes, as well as for student visa entry with associated 
(capped) work rights. These entry administration arrangements are especially possible to 
enforce for an island continent such as Australia. Together they ensure that regulated visa 
entry (except for visa-free entry from New Zealand, which is itself a high wage country) can 
re-assure the Australian public that working opportunities for the least skilled are not unduly 
disadvantaged by the immigration numbers experienced. 
 
Conclusions  
This paper has examined two key dimensions of the impact of immigration for Australia. One 
was sub-national and the other was national. We have argued that policy design – particularly 
the two-step visa process for regional migrants – has allowed substantial and effective 
regional location encouragement for immigrants over the past decade. Equally, the Australian 
immigration program’s emphasis on skilled migration has helped to ensure that there have 
been no net job losses for the Australian economy as a consequence of the overall 
immigration program. Putting the two together, the job creation dimensions of immigration 
may mean that regional policies seeking greater population growth away from the 
metropolitan locus of much Australian demography can be benefitted by the use of targeted 
migration visa entry conditions. If there are economies of scale and scope in such regional 
areas, as will often be the case, then, in economic terms, this may be a net advantage 
economically compared to metropolitan settlement. Skill requirements for entry can also 
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ensure that immigrants do not disadvantage less-skilled resident workers and indeed, 
combined with the regional encouragement element, can productively up-skill regional 
workforces.  
 
However, whether this potential has been fully realised to its optimum under the Australian 
immigration model, with the growth over time of both a ‘skilled worker’ and ‘regional 
location’ emphasis, remains as a future research project that looks for an analyst with the 
multi-disciplinary capabilities and ceaseless intellectual curiosity of a Graeme Hugo. Further, 
more detailed research is needed, as ever. Key research questions remain, including whether 
the skills that are prioritised are the right ones for Australian labour market needs, whether 
regional areas are selected well in allowing for critical minimum mass in retaining and 
benefitting from immigrant skills, whether wage and income effects diverge from 
employment impacts, and more. But the potential seems clear from the cases examined here, 
for carefully focussed social science research to inform policy advance for the national 
benefit, even in somewhat contested areas where seemingly self-evident propositions can be 
shown to require more nuanced understanding. Widely understood benefits can be enhanced 
and seeming negatives can be shown to be otherwise, or mitigated with well-designed policy. 
The public discourse around immigration can become better informed accordingly. 
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Table 1. Key characteristics of the SSRM Scheme skilled visas 
 
Visa name Stay Points test Nomination Job offer Concessional criteria Areas eligible 
Regional Sponsored 
Migration Scheme 
(RSMS)1 
Permanent, minimum 
2-year stay with the 
nominating employer 
No Employer No Concessions are available 
for age, skills and English 
language ability (also for 
the non-regional version of 
this visa, the Employer-
Nominated Scheme (ENS) 
visa)2 
Regional or low population growth 
areas excluding: Sydney, 
Wollongong, Newcastle, Melbourne, 
Brisbane and Gold Coast 3 
Skilled-Designated Area 
Sponsored (SDAS). 
Ceased in 2007. 
Permanent till 2006 
then a two-step visa 
(temporary to 
permanent) 
No Eligible family 
member residing in 
a Designated Area 
who provided an 
assurance of 
support 
No, but 
occupation from 
the Skilled 
Occupation List 
(SOL) 
Concessional minimum 
period of work experience 
and lower English language 
standards than under the 
non-regional family-
nominated visa 
All Australia was Designated except: 
Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong, 
Brisbane, Sunshine Coast, Gold Coast 
and Perth 
 
State/Territory-
Nominated Independent 
(STNI). Ceased in 2007. 
Permanent, minimum 
2-year stay in the 
nominating 
State/Territory 
Yes State/Territory 
Government 
No, but 
occupation from 
a State/Territory 
List of 
Occupations in 
Demand (some 
occupations may 
be in demand 
only in some 
regions of a 
State/Territory) 
Concessional points to 
qualify (pool mark not pass 
mark) 
Jurisdictions were joining STNI 
progressively. Initially, this visa was 
offered in Tasmania, Victoria, South 
Australia, from 2005 Western 
Australia, then followed by other 
jurisdictions 
Skilled-Independent 
Regional (SIR) 
introduced in 2004 and 
ceased in 2007. 
Temporary leading to 
permanent after 
meeting minimum 
residency and work 
conditions in the 
jurisdiction/Designated 
Area for which the 
nomination was made. 
e.g. for SIR 2 years of 
residence and 1 year of 
employment before 
applying for 
permanent residence 
Yes State/Territory 
Government which 
attracted bonus 
points 
Concessional points to 
qualify (SIR pass mark) 
Regional or low population growth 
areas excluding: Sydney, Newcastle, 
Wollongong, NSW Central Coast, 
Brisbane, Gold Coast, Perth, 
Melbourne and ACT 
Skilled-Regional, prior to 
2012-13 known as 
Skilled-Regional 
Sponsored (SRS). The 
SRS was an 
amalgamation of SDAS 
and SIR visas.  
Yes State/Territory 
Government or 
eligible family 
member – both 
nominations attract 
bonus points 
 
 
States/Territories 
determine if job 
offer required. In 
any case, 
occupation from 
a State/Territory 
List of 
Occupations in 
Competent English  (i.e. 
score of 6 in each of the 
four components of IELTS) 
acceptable but attracts no 
points  
For State/Territory Government 
nomination regional or low 
population growth areas excluding: 
Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong, 
NSW Central Coast, Brisbane, Gold 
Coast, Melbourne and ACT. 
For nomination by a family member 
Designated Areas that is all Australia 
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Demand (some 
occupations may 
be in demand 
only in some 
regions of a 
State/Territory) 
excluding: Sydney, Newcastle, 
Wollongong and Brisbane 
Skilled Nominated, prior 
to 2012-13 known as 
Skilled-Sponsored, which 
was an amalgamation of 
STNI and Skilled-
Australian Sponsored 
visas. Both were ceased 
in 2007. 
Permanent, minimum 
2-year residency and 
work in the jurisdiction 
for which the 
nomination was made 
Yes State/Territory 
Government which 
attracts bonus 
points 
All States and Territories 
Notes: 
1. The RSMS was the first explicit regional visa piloted in 1995 and expanded in 1996 (Parliament of Australia 2001). 
2. Prior to 1 July 2012 the RSMS visa required lower English level ability than the Employer-Nomination Scheme (ENS) visa and had more generous concessions for 
skill levels than currently available. 
3. In September 2011 Perth became an eligible location for the following visas: RSMS, Skilled-Regional Sponsored (SRS) temporary and Skilled-Regional permanent 
visas (DIBP n.d. b). 
Sources:  DIBP n.d.a; DIBP n.d. b; DIBP various websites; Golebiowska 2007; Parliament of Australia 2001. 
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Figure 1. Immigration and unemployment rates in Australia 1960- 2013 
Source: Elnasri 2015  
 
Table 2: Granger causality test results: Bivariate model 
Dependent variable Causal variable Causal lag chi2   P-values 
Ut Mt 1 1.125 0.289 
Ut Mt 2 0.001 0.974 
Ut Mt 3 0.062 0.804 
Ut Mt 4 0.083 0.773 
Ut Mt 5 0.055 0.814 
Mt Ut 1 0.197 0.657 
Mt Ut 2 0.033 0.856 
Mt Ut 3 0.065 0.799 
Mt Ut 4 0.069 0.794 
Mt Ut 5 0.019 0.888 
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Table 3: Unit root test 
Variable ADF test statistic p-value 
Ut -1.367 0.5978 
∆ Ut -5.073 0.0000 
Mt -2.493 0.3314 
∆ Mt -4.785 0.0005 
Wt -1.052 0.7338 
∆ Wt -5.747   0.0000 
Yt 1.245 0.9963 
∆ Yt -5.501 0.0000 
STOt -2.930 0.1528 
∆ STOt -4.153 0.0053 
BRt -2.002   0.2856 
∆BRt -4.400 0.0003 
Notes: ADF test the null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative is that the 
variable was generated by a stationary process. ∆ is the first difference of a series.  
 
Table 4: Granger causality test results from ECM Short run causation test, 1985- 2013 
Equation EC Ut Mt Wt Yt STOt BRt 
  Wald F-
statistics 
∆Ut lags 
Wald F-
statistics 
∆Mt lags 
Wald F-
statistics 
∆Wt lags 
Wald F-
statistics 
∆Yt lags 
Wald F-
statistics 
∆STOt lags 
Wald F-
statistics 
∆BRt lags 
Ut 0.01 
(0.9410) 
1.33 
(0.7227) 
5.54 
(0.1361) 
0.38 
(0.9443) 
1.31 
(0.7262) 
4.34 
(0.2270) 
1.77 
(0.6225) 
Mt 10.91 
(0.0010)*
** 
6.13 
(0.1056) 
10.69 
(0.0135)*
* 
11.60 
(0.0089)
* 
8.87 
(0.0310)** 
14.35 
(0.0025)*** 
7.95 
(0.0471)** 
Wt 0.26 
(0.6090) 
0.13 
(0.9883) 
2.24 
(0.5235) 
4.19 
(0.2416) 
2.75 
(0.4316) 
2.23 
0.5264 
5.35 
(0.1477) 
Yt 0.00 
(0.9600) 
0.97 
(0.8089) 
0.85 
(0.8364) 
0.42 
(0.9358) 
0.29 
(0.9618) 
0.49 
(0.9203) 
1.26 
(0.7376) 
STOt 0.08 
(0.7840) 
6.40 
(0.0937) 
4.82  
(0.1856) 
2.70 
(0.4398) 
7.90 
(0.0481)** 
8.47 
(0.0372)** 
1.90 
(0.5941) 
BRt 0.18 
(0.6674) 
0.81 
(0.8467) 
2.57 
(0.4634) 
0.09 
(0.9925) 
1.91 
(0.5913) 
2.96 
(0.3982) 
0.77 
(0.8567) 
Notes: The short-run causality tests are conducted by testing whether all the coefficients of the first difference 
of each variable are statistically different from zero as a group. The log run causality is tested by the significance 
of the error term EC.  
Terms *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5:  Granger causality test results from VECM 1960–2013 short run causation test 
 EC Ut Mt Wt Yt 
Equation  Wald F-
statistics ∆Ut 
lags 
Wald F-
statistics ∆Mt 
lags 
Wald F-
statistics ∆Wt 
lags 
Wald F-
statistics ∆Yt 
lags 
Ut 1.25 
(0.2638) 
2.48 
(0.4782) 
2.21  
(0.5301) 
1.13 
(0.7697) 
2.50 
(0.4745) 
Mt 0.12 
(0.7300) 
1.63 
(0.6518) 
6.75 
(0.0802) 
0.20 
(0.9774) 
0.34 
(0.9522) 
Wt 3.14 
(0.0764) 
1.73 
(0.6304) 
0.56 
0.9046 
1.65 
(0.6482) 
2.61 
(0.4552) 
Yt 3.37 
(0.0663) 
0.51 
(0.9161) 
1.12 
(0.7722) 
0.38 
(0.9444) 
0.33 
(0.9541) 
Notes: The short-run causality tests are conducted by testing whether all the coefficients of the first difference 
of each variable are statistically different from zero as a group. The long-run causality is tested by the significance 
of the error term EC.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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